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PANEL II: DISCUSSION TRANSCRIPT 
PROFESSOR KELLY: Professor Strauss. 
PROFESSOR STRAUSS:  Thanks very much.  And I’m sure 
with everyone else shares my appreciation for two such 
thoughtful and extraordinarily rich and well informed papers. 
If you listened carefully to the gracious introduction that I 
got, you heard no particular evidence of acquaintance on my 
part with the world of corporate law or financial regulation as 
such.  I’m an administrative lawyer.  I’ve served in government 
for a while, but on the health and safety side.  And sitting here 
in some way reminds me uncomfortably of the one time I taught 
a private law course at Columbia, which was contracts.  On the 
first day of class I remarked that they had, my students had 
probably worked out that I was a public lawyer by experience, 
but that really the basic moves and skills that we would be 
practicing were common to all lawyering and maybe it would be 
helpful to them to think of me as a football coach who this year 
was also assigned to help the lacrosse team.  This apparently 
produced panic among my students and so far as I could tell 
was the only thing I said during the semester that stuck in 
their memory.  Nonetheless, public lawyer, administrative law-
yer that I am, and this shapes the perspectives and reactions 
that I bring to these two fine papers.   
And maybe the place to start is with Eliot Spitzer, who has 
recurred again and again during today’s talks.  And perhaps it’s 
possible to see this in a slightly different way by looking at 
Merrill Lynch as an example of the supermarket, of the inte-
grated financial creation.  That suffered, at least so it appeared 
through the eyes of Eliot Spitzer, and I tend to see some merit 
in it, suffered from some internal conflicts of interest that had 
not been identified in the regulatory sphere.  So maybe this is 
emblematic of the problems presented to us by supermarkets, 
but I wonder if it’s emblematic of the appropriateness of re-
sponse through a single super regulator, or whether in fact the 
availability of an Eliot Spitzer or an SRO or a Securities and 
Exchange Commission, a variety of possible avenues of response 
to which the at least potentially mischievous participant in the 
supermarket will need to be responsive, of which it will need to 
be aware isn't a significant safeguard on the part of us, the folks 
who are subject to their power and possible market manipula-
tion. 
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Well, you’ll recognize in the comments a common feature of 
American thinking about law and constitutional affairs which 
sharply distinguishes us from our European colleagues, who 
tend to look for single grand schemes that will bring all things 
together beautifully in a coherent way.  And we like to muddle.  
And checks and balances, that’s an American theme and I sup-
pose it’s in some respect my response to the papers is to say, 
well, these are on the whole a good thing. 
I have four principal areas of response, interrelated.  One of 
them I can deal with very briefly, because Roberta [Karmel] 
said it so well, is the adventitious nature of the American devel-
opments. 
The second, the challenges and possibilities of what I’ll call 
cooperative federalism, but it extends past federalism to private 
organizations like the SRO’s. 
A third, and particularly important, I think, what I’ll call the 
limitations of expertise as a premise for regulation.  That is, the 
need to be concerned with the nature of the regulator.  My col-
league Jack Coffee was not able to be with us today, but if you 
looked at the original program you saw that he was going to 
deliver a paper on the problem of agency capture.  Well, the 
problem of agency capture is a real problem, and if there’s only 
one agency to capture it’s a much larger problem than it is if 
there are twenty or thirty of them.  That’s harder to do, albeit 
that introduces as well some inefficiencies of a nature that’s 
important to be aware of. 
And finally, and related to that, the centrality of private in-
terests to effective regulation. 
So the adventitious nature of American developments.  
American politics simply aren’t organized to produce rational 
design, a precision mechanism of government reflecting exqui-
site and comprehensive rationality.  And it starts with the fact 
that we don’t have parliamentary democracy in this country.  
And so members of Congress are free to go off on their own and 
not subject to the discipline of an executive who thinks he or 
she knows what it is he wants. 
It seems to me not to have been an accident that the creation 
of the unitary system of regulation in Great Britain was at-
tended by a remarkable political change in that country, al-
though, Claire [Kelly], you didn’t address it in quite that way.  
Here legislative action is rarely the result of thoughtful and 
comprehensive drafting, like the civil codes of Europe, but it 
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tends to be a spontaneous response to the perceived urgencies of 
the moment, developments in the nature of the market to de-
velopments in its size and the number of its firms, to economic 
crises, to particular outbreaks of unscrupulous or at least unac-
ceptably hazardous behavior.  And the resulting crazy quilt of 
institutions that can't be given a rational or scientific explana-
tion.  Its parts grew out of the crises, needs and changes of pre-
vious times and they stay with us until new crises, needs and 
changes cause us to adjust them. 
And I noticed in this respect, that in talking about the possi-
bilities of a comprehensive regulator, there’s been this strange 
possible participant that’s appeared and disappeared at var ious 
times during the course of the day.   
We’ve tended to talk about banking, insurance and securities.  
Every now and then the CFTC and what it regulates has reared 
its head and then it’s disappeared again.  Commodities aren’t 
on the general map that we’ve been talking about today, but I 
thought we heard enough about commodities this morning, and 
particularly about those things that people could pretend were 
commodities, manipulate into regulation by commodities regu-
lators instead of securities regulators, to think that that too is a 
necessary part of the theoretical structure. 
Well, I have to say that, in a similar way, it seems to me that 
Europe’s issues and institutions are and will be precisely the 
product of becoming Europe, of having to accommodate to new 
realities of markets and the information age.  The old jealous-
ies, languages, preferences, legal systems, governmental styles, 
and expectations and habits of Europe.  And it’s a lot tougher, 
with twenty languages and governments that have been in 
place for two or three centuries or longer, than it has proved to 
be — much longer — than it has proved to be here, I would 
suppose. 
We’ve been talking about Europe and the United States, but I 
suppose it’s also hard to imagine in a globalizing economy that 
these developments are going to stop with Europe.  As the na-
ture of markets and market participation change, law and insti-
tutions are going to follow, because they have to.  And so tomor-
row this conference will be talking about some global regulator 
of the securities markets. 
But the institutions and professional alignments and expecta-
tions will grow up around whatever arrangements we make, as 
they have around the arrangements we’ve already made, and 
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then became stuck.  Not rational, necessarily, but not unwork-
able, either.  And so we live with them until they’re proved in-
adequate. 
So the challenges and possibilities of cooperative federalism.  
Europe, as I now understand it, faces the imperatives that 
drove the expansion of our federal government’s activity during 
the New Deal, when the Securities and Exchange Commission 
was born.  There is now a European economy.  It didn’t used to 
exist in the way in which it does today.  It has needs that can't 
be safely entrusted to individual states that might be too easily 
tempted into efforts to favor their own citizens, that could pro-
duce a race to the bottom or, worse, war, economic or real. It 
certainly has done that in the past, in the history of that conti-
nent. 
So I think we have to expect European institutions to emerge.  
But what will be the character of their political control in a 
Europe that still lacks for itself genuine democracy?  That’s an 
issue that we haven't heard talked about really at all today, the 
nature of the political controls over these institutions, either 
within the nation or, perhaps more importantly, within Europe, 
itself.  How can we expect these institutions to interact with the 
still empowered state institutions, each in this case acting un-
der unique conditions of language, political history and gov-
ernmental institution?  
I think among the lessons of the American experience is that 
ideas like subsidiarity, however powerful they may be intellec-
tually, will not inevitably constrain the growth of central insti-
tutions.  Thomas Jefferson, in a corresponding situation long 
ago characterized the reasoning possible under the equivalent 
American principle as the house of cards, as house of cards rea-
son.  You can just build on it until you get to the point of intel-
lectual collapse, I suppose. 
As the economy of Europe becomes more and more interde-
pendent, what individual states can effectively accomplish, each 
within the limits of its own jurisdiction, will become more and 
more subject to rational question.  And the destruction of such 
arguments by experience was almost precisely the experience 
that we had during the Great Depression of the 1930’s that 
brought central federal regulation of the financial markets. 
So then the thing to see, it seems to me, is that the federalist 
argument doesn’t just produce regulation here or there, but one 
has the SEC operating in cooperation with the SRO’s, with pri-
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vate regulators who must also in some respects cooperate with 
state authorities in many federal regulatory programs — if not 
the SEC, state regulators in turn operate under the supervision 
of federal as well as state authorities.  And that’s what we hear 
about as being in the future of Europe, subject to the loss of 
their powers, or some of them, if they don’t satisfy their federal 
overseers that they are satisfactorily carrying out their respon-
sibilities. 
Politically, I suppose, having national authorities carry out 
European policies under supervision — one way to understand 
the elegant charts of Professor Di Giorgio’s and Dr. Di Noia’s 
paper is both politically and legally attractive.  It appears to 
retain national power and it subdues possible questions of legal-
ity and authority for the imposition of legal sanctions.  But 
when they’re thought to be national departures from the Euro-
pean norm, when the question is sanctions against those na-
tional authorities or perhaps the suspension of their responsi-
bilities in favor of direct European action, which are the things 
that can happen in this federal system, then the difficulties in-
deed may be substantial.  No one looking at the contortions that 
our Supreme Court is now going through over the  relations be-
tween the state and federal authority, even under a system as 
long established and as firmly grounded as our own, could pos-
sibly think otherwise. 
So then the limitations of expertise as a premise for regula-
tion.  Both papers, again, and perhaps especially the Di Giorgio-
Di Noia paper, are written from a perspective of confidence in 
what I might call virtuous objectified expert regulation.  This is 
the unseen quality of Professor Schooner’s superheroes this 
morning.  It was not just that they were men of steel or superb 
detectives.  It’s also that they were rigorously honest, and they 
always acted on the public’s behalf.  Do we have that kind of 
confidence about all of our regulators all of the time?  And what 
mechanisms do we have in place to secure their honesty, their 
responsibility, their political accountability?   
It’s striking, in a way, that the agencies we’ve been talking 
about at the federal level are all so-called independent regula-
tory commissions.  That is to say, they’re at some remove from 
the President, maybe a little vulnerable to the Congress.  The 
chairman of one of the IRC’s once remarked that being the chair 
of an independent regulatory commission meant that you had to 
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appear naked in front of the 535 members of the United States 
Congress.   
Maybe they’re a little bit vulnerable to the Congress, but 
we’ve set them up with the idea that they ought to be outside 
politics.  No one has solved the constitutional question of how 
we can have the Federal Reserve in relationship to the Consti-
tution that we have, given the extraordinary independence that 
it’s had.  We’ve been rather lucky.  But what does the fact of 
these, I’ll say for the moment, three independent regulators — 
the SEC, the CFTC and the Fed — suggest for the possibilities 
of a committee of coordination? 
We have a committee of coordination.  It’s called the Presi-
dent, right?  And what Congress has deliberately done for its 
own reasons, which one can find explained in political history — 
Alexander Hamilton argued rather strongly for this — we have 
to separate the money supply from politics — is to put these 
regulators at the farthest remove possible within the frame-
work of our constitutional structure from the committee of coor-
dination.  And whatever that impulse is, shouldn’t we expect it 
also to work and to trouble the possibi lities of coordination in 
this context? 
Capture is seen as corruption or failure — and it sometimes 
is — and not as the product of legislative choice — as it also 
sometimes is — or political change — as it equally may be.  The 
general administrative law scholarship has at least moderated, 
if it hasn’t entirely abandoned, its faith in expertise for visions 
that attempt more room for politics as a desirable, honest, in-
evitable element of government.  And we need to think about 
how that can be achieved in these areas. 
So a consequence, then, seems to me is to bring into promi-
nence questions about the transparency of regulatory decision-
making, about expansive participation in regulatory decision-
making, about political controls over its outcome, that so far 
today I really haven't heard addressed.  But it seems to me if 
we’re engaging in discussions about institutional design, in 
matters as important to us as the monetary supply or the sta-
bility of our financial markets, we ought to be thinking about it.  
It’s particularly important in respect of policy making, rule 
making, in the American jargon. 
In the past, Europeans have been content to treat policy-
making simply as an output of parliamentary government and 
not be very concerned about how it happened.  It’s changing a 
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little bit, and I should think gratifyingly.  The American ap-
proach is very different. Particularly as policy-making moves 
out of the hands of ministries who can be controlled by a vote of 
no confidence in the parliament, it warrants a good deal of at-
tention. 
If independent regulatory commissions offer no assurance of 
pure expertise, one rule maker for all financial institutions 
would diminish further the claim to expertise and raise further 
the needs for mechanisms to assure consensus and transpar-
ency.  So when we’re thinking about how we want regulatory 
regimes constructed, I think it behooves us to think rather ag-
gressively about the controls and politics that will operate on 
them and in them, not only in the first flush of enthusiasm for 
their mission, but also over the longer term. 
I mean, you may know the story of the creation of the first 
American independent regulatory commission, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.  The railroads were at first alarmed 
because this had come about out of basically a populist upswell 
in response to the inability of the states to control the price 
gouging by the railroads.  The Attorney General took the presi-
dent of some railroad aside and said, don’t worry about it.  
You’ll live with this for five or ten years and then it will be 
yours.  And he was, of course, right. 
The failures of many agencies can, I think, be ascribed to the 
absence of such thinking.  The great American scholar, Louis 
Jaffe, in a wonderfully titled piece he wrote near the end of his 
long career, The Myth of the Ideal Administration, remarked on 
his conviction that we get about as much regulation as our po-
litical leaders are convinced we’re going to effectively demand.  
Keeping the conditions of public awareness necessary for effec-
tive political demand is a challenging task.  And I expect it will 
be a particularly challenging task in Europe. 
So, finally, the centrality of private interests, of the many 
voices to effective regulation.  Both papers do express a concern 
with the problem of capture, which can be a problem.   Yet, de-
pending on how we look at it, it might also be a strength, or 
even a precondition. 
One of the things about having any number of agencies is 
that different participants in the regulatory framework may 
tend to be served by different agencies among the groups that 
are there.  Certainly Professor Di Giorgio and Dr. Di Noia 
might be right, that one risk of a single unitary regulator is that 
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it might more easily succumb to the subversion of collusive rela-
tionships with the intended object.  And regulatory competition 
has the possible virtue of avoiding this problem at the cost of 
the inefficiencies that Professor Jackson suggested this morn-
ing.  But I do think it’s worth paying attention to all those 
groups that are interested in the nature and extent of regula-
tion as well as the bureaucrats and politicians, themselves, and 
acknowledging that they have different ends and views, that 
they’re competing. 
So among those that come to mind in respect of the regula-
tory schemes we’ve been talking about today are individual in-
vestors, institutional investors like pension funds, investment 
professionals, like the folks at, I’ll say Merrill Lynch, but they’re 
more than a brokerage house these days, banks, insurance 
companies, entrenched corporate management — we haven't 
heard so much talk about them, but they’re in many respects 
the real objects of regulation, whether they’re interested in se-
curing capital or maintaining power — politicians, that is to 
say, legislators and executive officials, members of the en-
trenched civil service, who have their own axes to grind and 
their own strong sense of how their activities serve the public 
interest. 
And we might also think here about the implications of those 
private recoveries and the defense fee.  The defendants in those 
cases have to pay their lawyers in order to keep the price as low 
as $4 million.  So it must be higher than that.  The implication 
of all of this for the regulated. 
Real problems for rationalization.  But it really is harder to 
capture the SEC and Eliot Spitzer than it would be to capture 
the SEC or Eliot Spitzer alone.  So these are perhaps also ele-
ments of the complex systems by which we hope to keep scoun-
drels in their holes and public confidence in our financial mar-
kets high.  Thanks a lot. 
PROFESSOR KELLY:  I’d like to give the presenters a 
chance to perhaps respond and then we have some time for 
questions from the floor. 
PROFESSOR DI GIORGIO:  Just a quick comment to the 
very interesting points that you raised.  Of course, yes, what 
you said about the political control is what we call the account-
ability.  You want to have independent but accountable agen-
cies, and this is an important problem that probably deserves 
one or more papers. 
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It is already a big issue in the European Monetary Union, be-
cause . . . we have delegated monetary policy to the European 
Central Bank, which is a fantastic institution, technically well 
equipped, and has all the instruments to reach its targets.  But 
the problem is that it also sets the targets.  So usually you don’t 
want to have a central bank which is politically completely in-
dependent, because inflation rate is a tax and in democracies 
taxes are usually selected by the parliament. 
So this is already a problem in Europe and we have to deal 
with this problem also in the context of financial market regula-
tion. 
PROFESSOR STRAUSS:  It’s a tax only on creditors. 
DR. Di NOIA:  Another quick point.  Also you raised the ques-
tion if we can trust — I mean, the . . . honesty of these regula-
tors.  I hope — I’m coming from a regulator, so I think we can 
trust them.  Probably we cannot trust their ability to regulate 
and to supervise.  So the real problem is, at least for the Italian 
institutions in this period in the last years, is that they really 
are . . . lacking expertise.  And in a sense they are — many peo-
ple like me go away, go in the market.  But there is not a tradi-
tion of the other way back. 
So in a sense they’re not specializing enough.  This morning it 
was pointed out in order to supervise derivatives you need 
really in financial innovation, you need people that really know 
the market and specialized people.  And probably this is what 
the institution, even the European institutions, still lack.  And 
this is, I think one of the biggest problems. 
PROFESSOR STRAUSS:  Who will watch the watchers is in 
some respect the defining question of American constitutional 
law. 
DR. Di NOIA:  This is off the topic. 
PROFESSOR DE GIORGIO:  For this you should provide a 
good mechanism to have incentives for good regulation.  But 
you cannot just trust the regulator.  That I agree. 
PROFESSOR KARMEL:  I would say only that I think the is-
sue of accountability is indeed a very important issue.  And it’s 
probably because Americans don’t trust power, whether it’s in 
the private sector or in government, that we have such a tre-
mendously chaotic system of regulation.  Because I think there 
is a fear that if a single regulator gets too much power, that 
power will be abused and that there will be insufficient ac-
countability. 
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And at the federal level, our system of accountability primar-
ily is Congressional oversight committees.  And watching that 
process over the course of much of my career, I would say it’s 
not very inspiring.  And it doesn’t give one a sense that it would 
be a good idea to have too much power in a single agency that 
has accountability only to some Congressional oversight com-
mittee. 
PROFESSOR KELLY:  I know it’s late in the day.  We have 
time, though, for a couple of questions from the floor. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  I just want to make it clear 
that Batman is a vigilante [laughter].  I actually had a question 
for Professor Di Giorgio about your comments on the Bundes 
Bank.  I wonder if in Europe, in the Euro area countries — 
those few countries where the bank supervisor is at the central 
bank which is no longer central — whether that fact might be 
an impediment to a working proposal.  Are those banks going to 
be reluctant to give up what little task — the one thing that 
they still have is really a formal role in supervisory, since they 
no longer make monetary policy.  I’m just curious what you 
think about that. 
PROFESSOR Di GIORGIO:  Of course they are reluctant.  
And they also have another powerful instrument, which is the 
European Central Bank General Council.  The governing body, 
is made up of twelve national governors and six central ones.  
And so the weight of the decision is in the periphery and not in 
the center of the body. 
Actually, there is a paper that before Carmine mentioned of 
the European Central Bank, in which there is big support for 
the important role of central banks in banking supervision, al-
though the trend in Europe is totally the opposite. 
PROFESSOR STRAUSS:  Is it possible to remark that that 
scheme, like our Fed, I think, is institutionalized capture?  That 
is to say, it is the banking business that is essentially in control 
of the banking regulator. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  This is for Professor Kar-
mel.  Would you comment in terms of the federal/state dynamic 
in the securities area that perhaps the state role is really one 
maybe of accountability to the SEC.  When you look through the 
history, that the states brought the issue of the penny stocks 
and the blank check line pools, and you had the 1990 Act, they 
brought to the attention — and there were federal rules then 
with respect to those, Rule 419. 
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Then you had the states bring the issue of the microcap fraud 
and federal rules on that.  Online trading, day trading, and 
even as late as Sarbanes-Oxley, we now have in federal law that 
state enforcement actions, certain state enforcement actions 
now become the statutory disqualification under the ’34 [Securi-
ties Exchange] Act for certain brokers and associated persons. 
So I’m thinking in terms of not so much state and federal in 
regulatory competition, in the sense of competing against each 
other, but more or less an accountability, and when something 
is brought to the federal government’s attention through state 
actions, whether they be studies done by the states or whether 
they be actions by attorneys general such as Eliot Spitzer, that 
the federal government then, for national problems, should ad-
dress it and then the states kind of recede.  And that’s really 
kind of our accountability. 
PROFESSOR KARMEL:  You could look at it that way. 
I think another way to look at it is that it has something to do 
with this problem of capture. 
The SEC is focused on the markets and on the securities in-
dustry, on capital formation, and to some extent institutional 
investors.  Whereas the states think of securities regulation 
more as consumer protection, that they’re more focused on pro-
tecting individual investors who believe they’ve been ripped off 
by some fraud in the market. 
So I think it’s in part this difference in focus that gets the 
states very excited about some kinds of frauds that you wonder, 
well, why didn’t the SEC ever focus on this.  Because that’s not 
what they’re looking at most of the time. 
And, yes, you can look at it as an accountability, but I don’t 
think the purpose of the states acting is really to make the SEC 
more accountable.  It’s to protect the residents within their 
state that they feel need some protection. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  In terms of this account-
ability concept, I know the French have a delict that sounds in 
the Americanese as the failure of a supervisor, a public supervi-
sor to do its job. 
I think the House of Lords has twice in recent years been 
seized of the question of whether community law sets up such a 
tort against the Bank of England.  They said no, but it has re-
fused in a separate decision, summary judgment, what we call 
summary judgment, when one makes out that the common law 
should evolve to consider a tort of administrative neglect. 
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Now, this, of course, would be startling news over here.  But 
does that have a controlling element in Europe?  Is there such a 
delict, tort, I have no idea of the Italian usage. 
PROFESSOR FERRAN:  In the U.K., at least, the FSA enjoys 
immunity from claims for negligence, which I believe is sort of 
common practice for banking regulators to have, and that’s been 
extended to the FSA generally.  But it doesn’t have immunity 
from deliberate misfeasance.  And that’s what the issue has 
been in the cases you mentioned.  It also doesn’t have immunity 
for human rights violations, which is the European Convention 
dimension.  And it’s as yet unclear what exactly that will allow 
in sort of challenges. 
QUESTION FROM AUDIENCE:  [Unintelligible]  
PROFESSOR FERRAN:  Exactly.  
DR. Di NOIA:  Formally, Italy, at least, for example, 
CONSOB [Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa], 
but there is not a formal immunity.  Some judges actually — I 
mean, there are some cases not yet solved, and some people 
tried to take CONSOB to court in cases of not having controlled 
or supervised that well.  But it’s not clear, and we are actually 
curious, because there is no final decision in many of the cases, 
because according to some people, when they sued CONSOB of 
the administrative authority, and they want to pay a lot of 
money. 
On the other side, there’s an administrative authority, of 
course, all the decisions of CONSOB go to the administrative 
court there to separate decision.  But of course they have no 
direct input on, let’s say, private investors for the central bank. 
And then also for the sanctions that are issued by CONSOB 
or by the Bank of Italy against the, let’s say, banks or securities 
firms, there is a sort of appeal.  Formerly, the sanctions are 
proposed by the bank or by CONSOB to the treasury.  Then the 
treasury issues a decree with a fine, let’s say.  And you can also 
go to appeal to court for that. 
PROFESSOR KELLY:  Any other questions? 
Well, I think I’d like to take this opportunity to thank all of 
our presenters today and our commentators.  Also to thank our 
hosts, the Center for the Study of International Business Law 
and the Brooklyn Journal of International Law.  In particular, 
Professor Karmel and Professor Fanto for organizing this event.  
Also Michelle Scotto and our symposium editor, Jessica Lubar-
sky, as well as the students of the Journal and the student fel-
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lows of the Center who worked here today.  And we look forward 
to seeing the papers and commentaries published in the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law.  Thank you. 
 
